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Abstract 
This	 paper	 investigates	 the	 influence	 of	 parental	 education	 on	 the	 returns	 to	 experience	 of	
Italian	men	 using	 a	 new	 longitudinal	 dataset	 that	 contains	 detailed	 information	 on	 individual	
working	 histories.	 Our	 favourite	 panel	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 an	 additional	 year	 of	 parental	
education	increases	sons'	weekly	wages	by	11.7%	after	twenty	years	of	experience	and	that	71%	
of	this	effect	emerges	during	the	career.	We	show	that	this	effect	holds	irrespective	of	individual	
abilities,	 and	 it	 appears	 the	 result	 of	 both	 a	 glass	 ceiling	 effect,	 due	 to	 the	 complementarity	
between	parental	 education	 and	 son’s	 abilities,	 and	 a	 parachute	 effect,	 associated	with	 family	
labour	market	connections.					
Keywords:	Intergenerational	Inequality;	Parental	Education;	Experience‐Earnings	profiles;	
Human	Capital.	
JEL	codes:	J62	;	J24	;	J31.	
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1.	INTRODUCTION	
Intergenerational	 inequality	 in	 socio‐economic	 attainments	 has	 usually	 been	 studied	
through	the	lens	of	human	capital	theory.	A	large	body	of	empirical	research	has	made	
this	 view	 prominent,	 showing	 that	 parental	 characteristics	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	
formation	of	the	various	skills	on	which	labour	market	success	depends	(e.g.,	Becker	and	
Tomes,	 1979	 and	 1986).	 Thanks	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 new	 datasets	 that	 link	 parents’	
characteristics	 to	 their	 children’s	 labour	 market	 outcomes,	 recent	 research	 has	
broadened	this	view	and	indicated	the	existence	of	other,	more	direct	channels	through	
which	parents	may	influence	their	children’s	outcomes,	such	as	 job	referrals,	nepotism	
and	the	transmission	of	employers	(e.g.,	Magruder,	2010;	Corak	and	Piraino,	2011).		
This	paper	contributes	to	 this	growing	 literature	by	analysing	the	 lifelong	 incidence	of	
parental	background	on	children’s	earnings	for	cohorts	of	Italian	men	who	entered	the	
labour	market	 between	1975	 and	 2000.	 Italy	 is	 an	 intriguing	 country	 for	 research	 on	
intergenerational	 inequality:	 on	 the	one	hand,	 it	 has	 one	of	 the	 lowest	 levels	 of	 social	
mobility	among	developed	countries	(Corak,	2013);	on	the	other	hand,	it	has	a	tuition‐
free	and	rather	egalitarian	educational	system	(Checchi	et	al.,	1999).	In	addition,	Italy	is	
well	known	as	a	 country	where	 family	 connections	have	a	 considerable	effect	on	both	
job	finding	rates	and	the	probability	of	achieving	prestigious	occupations	(particularly	in	
liberal	 professions;	 Pellizzari	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Aina	 and	 Nicoletti,	 2014).	 In	 recent	
comparisons	across	EU	countries,	the	relatively	low	social	mobility	of	Italy	and	Spain	is	
partially	also	explained	by	a	parachute	effect,	which	ensures	a	wage	premium	to	well‐off	
individuals	who	end	up	in	low‐	and	medium‐paid	occupations	(Raitano	and	Vona,	2015).	
To	 investigate	 the	 direct	 influence	 of	 parental	 background	 on	 children’s	 experience‐
earnings	 profiles	 and	 the	 mechanisms	 shaping	 this	 influence,	 this	 paper	 resorts	 to	 a	
unique	longitudinal	dataset	that	contains	information	on	family	background,	educational	
attainment	and	detailed	individual	working	histories.	The	impressive	length	of	our	panel	
allows	 us	 to	 estimate	 the	 direct	 influence	 of	 parental	 background	 conditional	 on	
effective	 experience	 levels,	 individual	 abilities	 and	 education.	The	 first	 contribution	of	
this	 paper	 is	 the	 use	 of	 panel	 data	 techniques	 to	 unravel	 the	 crucial	 importance	 of	
parental	 background	 on	 workers’	 experience‐earning	 profile.	 Our	 favourite	 estimate	
shows	that	after	twenty	years	of	experience,	the	direct	effect	of	parental	background	on	
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children’s	earning	is	11.7%,	and	71%	of	this	effect	is	formed	during	the	worker’s	career	
rather	than	being	dependent	on	pre‐labour	market	conditions.		
However,	 standard	 panel	 data	 techniques	 are	 not	 enough	 to	 disentangle	whether	 the	
direct	 influence	of	parental	background	on	experience‐earning	profiles	passes	through	
better	 unobservable	 skills	 and	 thus	 learning	 capacities	 or	 through	 family	 ties	 used	 in	
finding	better	 jobs	or	 in	getting	promotions	within	 the	same	 job.	We	propose	 to	 solve	
this	 identification	 problem	 using	 the	 very	 general	 theoretical	 claim	 (which	 is	 also	
empirically	 well	 grounded;	 Cunha	 and	 Heckman,	 2007)	 that	 parental	 background	
children’s	 idiosyncratic	abilities	independent	of	background	are	complementary	inputs	
in	 the	 formation	 of	 individual	 skills	 and	 learning	 capacity.	 Operating	 under	 this	
assumption	and	using	quantile	regression	fixed	effects,	we	expect	to	observe	a	stronger	
parental	background	effect	in	the	top	of	the	ability	distribution,	i.e.,	a	glass	ceiling	effect.	
In	 addition,	we	expect	 to	observe	 that	 steeper	 experience‐earning	profiles	 for	well‐off	
children	are	primarily	concentrated	within	the	group	of	highly	educated	workers,	where	
such	 ability‐background	 complementarity	 is	 magnified.	 The	 fact	 that	 we	 observe	 the	
coexistence	of	a	glass	ceiling	effect	at	the	top	of	the	ability	distribution	and	a	parachute	
effect	at	the	bottom	(i.e.,	 for	people	descending	the	educational	 ladder	relative	to	their	
parents)	 gives	 empirical	 substance	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 family	 connections	 matter	 in	
misallocating	 talents	 in	 the	 Italian	 labour	 market.	 Although	 this	 evidence	 is	 not	
conclusive	 absent	 an	 exogenous	 shock	 that	 asymmetrically	 affects	 abilities	 and	 family	
connections,	our	research	opens	a	new	avenue	to	identify	the	mechanism	through	which	
parental	background	influences	children’s	lifelong	outcomes.			
It	is	worth	noting	that	our	paper	differs	from	previous	research	that	attempts	to	identify	
the	 influence	 of	 family	 connections	 in	 finding	 good	 jobs:	 we	 do	 not	 resort	 to	 self‐
reported	 measures	 of	 relatives’	 help.	 Instead,	 we	 combine	 the	 simple	 theoretical	
assumption	of	ability‐background	complementarity	with	the	possibility	to	condition	our	
estimates	to	individual	abilities	to	disentangle	the	glass	ceiling	and	parachute	effects.		
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organised	as	follows.	The	next	section	presents	the	main	
advantages	 of	 our	 dataset	 to	 study	 the	 lifelong	 influence	 of	 parental	 background	 on	
children’s	earnings.	Section	3	presents	preliminary	evidence	of	how	the	point	estimates	
of	 the	 parental	 background	 effect	 keeps	 increasing	 along	 the	 career	 path.	 Section	 4	
sketches	 in	 detail	 the	 empirical	 strategy	 and	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 used	 to	
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disentangle	 the	 two	 mechanisms	 at	 work.	 Section	 5	 discusses	 the	 main	 results,	 and	
Section	6	briefly	concludes.		
	
2.	DATA	
The	availability	of	a	longitudinal	dataset	tracking	a	large	portion	of	working	histories	for	
individuals	with	different	 family	backgrounds	 represents	 the	 essential	 requirement	 to	
investigate	the	role	played	by	education	and	parental	background	in	shaping	returns	to	
experience.	A	 recently	built	dataset	 called	AD‐SILC	satisfies	 this	 essential	 requirement	
because	it	tracks	Italian	workers	for	an	average	of	15.2	years	and	contains	information	
about	children’s	and	parents’	education.	AD‐SILC	is	the	result	of	a	match	between	the	IT‐
SILC	 2005	 cross‐sectional	 sample	 (i.e.,	 the	 Italian	 version	 of	 the	 2005	 wave	 of	 the	
European	 Union	 Statistics	 on	 Income	 and	 Living	 Conditions	 ‐	 EU‐SILC)	 and	 the	
administrative	 longitudinal	 records	 provided	 by	 the	 Italian	 National	 Social	 Security	
Institute	 (INPS).1	In	 particular,	 the	 cross‐sectional	 variables	 collected	 in	 the	 IT‐SILC	
2005	have	been	enriched	by	 the	 individual	 social	 security	 records	since	 their	entry	 in	
the	labour	market	up	to	2009.	In	a	nutshell,	this	new	dataset	enriches	the	very	detailed	
information	on	working	histories	that	can	be	obtained	from	the	social	security	archives	
(e.g.,	earnings	and	workers’	status)	with	time‐invariant	characteristics	related	to	family	
background	and	education.		
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 study,	 AD‐SILC	 has	 other	 remarkable	 strengths.	 First	 and	
foremost,	our	data	allow	for	a	precise	reconstruction	of	workers’	effective	experience.	As	
shown	by	Blau	and	Kahn	(2013),	relying	on	effective	rather	than	on	potential	experience	
or	on	survey	data	responses	is	crucial	to	correctly	analyse	the	returns	to	human	capital	
accumulation.2	More	in	detail,	because	all	types	of	workers	are	obliged	to	enrol	in	social	
security,	we	can	reconstruct	all	the	individual	working	histories,	distinguishing	between	
inactivity	 periods	 and	 changes	 in	 employment	 status	 (e.g.,	 employment,	 self‐
employment,	 and	 unemployment).	 Thus,	 our	 panel	 is	 free	 from	 any	 attrition,	 and	 it	
																																																													
1	IT‐SILC	2005	has	been	merged	with	the	several	archives	managed	by	INPS	that	collect	information	for	all	
types	 of	 workers:	 private	 employees,	 public	 employees,	 parasubordinate	 workers	 (i.e.,	 individuals	
formally	 acting	 as	 self‐employed	 workers	 but	 usually	 working	 as	 employees),	 farmers	 and	 all	 self‐
employed	categories	(i.e.,	craftsmen,	dealers	and	the	various	groups	of	professionals).	
2	Potential	 experience	 is	 computed	 as	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 year	 of	 the	 last	 graduation	 and	 the	
worker’s	 age,	 under	 the	 assumption	 that	 there	 are	 no	 career	 interruptions.	 In	 addition,	 potential	
experience	is	measured	in	years	rather	than	in	weeks.		
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allows	us	to	compute	effective	experience	as	the	sum	of	the	weeks	spent	working	as	a	
private	employee,	a	public	employee	or	a	self‐employed	worker.3	In	addition,	 the	 INPS	
archives	identify	the	firm	for	which	an	individual	works,	thus	allowing	us	to	observe	job‐
to‐job	 transitions,	 firm	changes	and	 firm	 tenure.	 In	general,	AD‐SILC	allows	 for	a	 fine‐
grained	 decomposition	 of	 working	 histories	 into	 several	 detailed	 episodes.	 This	
advantage	 will	 be	 exploited	 to	 disentangle	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 parental	
education	affects	the	experience‐earning	profile.		
To	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 AD‐SILC	 is	 one	 of	 the	 few	 datasets	 available	
internationally	 that	 combines	 detailed	 information	 on	 working	 histories	 and	 family	
characteristics.	 Similar	 data	 are	 primarily	 available	 for	 highly	 mobile	 Scandinavian	
countries	 and	 partially	 for	 the	 UK,	 as	 the	 population	 sampled	 in	 the	 National	 Child	
Development	 Survey	 and	 in	 the	 British	 Cohort	 Study	 are	 getting	 older	 (Gregg	 et	 al.,	
2014),	but	not	for	the	relatively	immobile	Mediterranean	countries.		
Our	 primary	 estimation	 sample	 is	 selected	 to	 minimise	 the	 influence	 of	 confounding	
factors	that	are	likely	to	affect	our	estimates	of	the	returns	to	experience	and	education.	
First	of	all,	we	consider	only	males	to	overcome	difficulties	associated	with	the	different	
labour	 supply	 behaviours	 across	 genders.	 Second,	 we	 use	 only	 private	 employees	
because	 incomes	earned	by	other	categories	are	 likely	 to	be	reported	with	substantial	
measurement	 error.	 Unlike	 private	 employees’	 earnings,	 self‐employed	 incomes	 are	
plagued	 by	 underreporting	 and	 truncation	 in	 the	 administrative	 archives,	 whereas	
reliable	earnings	for	public	employees	and	parasubordinate	workers	have	been	available	
in	 INPS	 archives	 only	 since	 1996.	 However,	 it	 is	 worth	 recalling	 that	 periods	 spent	
working	as	public	employees,	parasubordinates	and	self‐employed	workers	are	included	
in	the	computation	of	effective	experience,	which	can	be	considered	a	sufficient	statistic	
of	the	entire	work	history.	
In	 this	 paper,	we	 use	 the	 cohorts	 of	males	who	 entered	 the	 labour	market	 as	 private	
employees	between	1975	and	2000	and	observe	their	working	career	up	to	the	end	of	
2009.4	We	 identify	 the	 entry	 year	 as	 the	 first	 year	 with	 a	 private	 employment	 spell	
lasting	at	least	13	weeks	and	at	an	age	no	younger	than	15	and	no	higher	than	34.	For	
																																																													
3	Consistent	with	the	Italian	rules	about	contractual	seniority,	effective	experience	is	computed	including	
weeks	 spent	 receiving	 sickness	 or	 parental	 allowances	 or	 being	 temporarily	 suspended	 by	 the	 firm	
without	being	fired	(receiving	the	so‐called	Cassa	Integrazione	allowance).	
4	Note	 that	 possible	 periods	 spent	 working	 as	 a	 public	 employee	 or	 a	 self‐employed	 before	 1975	 are	
included	in	the	computation	of	individual	experience.	
6 
 
each	 year,	we	 consider	workers	 aged	 15‐64.	We	 exclude	 from	 the	 sample	 individuals	
who	 do	 not	 have	 Italian	 citizenship	 because	 the	 retrospective	 dataset	 has	
underrepresented	 immigrants	 in	 past	 years	 (the	 panel	 is	 developed	 starting	 from	 the	
resident	population	in	2005).		
The	 final	 sample	 is	 composed	 of	 88,000	 longitudinal	 observations	 concerning	 5,774	
individuals.	 Table	 1	 shows	 that	 the	 longitudinal	 size	 of	 the	 sample	 is	 remarkable:	 the	
median	number	of	individual	observations	is	16,	while	75%	of	the	sample	is	followed	for	
at	 least	8	years,	and	90%	is	 followed	for	at	 least	5	years.	Given	the	small	average	firm	
size,	 Italian	 workers	 experience	 substantial	 mobility	 across	 firms	 throughout	 their	
career:	 the	mean	 value	 of	 the	 number	 of	 firm	 changes	 experienced	by	 the	 individuals	
tracked	in	our	sample	is	2.4.	As	a	consequence,	tenure	in	a	specific	firm	is	significantly	
lower	than	the	total	experience	in	the	labour	market	(on	average,	5.2	vs.	9.9).		
Our	main	variables	of	 interest	are	measured	as	 follows.	The	dependent	variable	 is	 the	
log	of	gross	weekly	wages	 from	private	employment	 (including	personal	 income	taxes	
and	employees’	social	insurance	contributions),	computed	by	dividing	the	total	earnings	
of	the	longest	working	episode	as	a	private	employee	in	a	year	for	the	related	working	
weeks.	Wages	are	converted	to	2010	constant	prices	using	the	consumer	price	index.	To	
reduce	 the	 effect	 of	 outliers,	 the	 top	 0.5%	 and	 the	 bottom	 1%	 of	 the	 weekly	 wage	
distribution	in	each	year	are	dropped.	We	use	weekly	wages	rather	than	annual	wages	
because	 they	 are	 a	 better	 proxy	 of	 a	worker’s	 productivity.	 In	 addition,	 using	weekly	
wages	 depurates	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 family	 background	 on	 labour	 supply	 decisions	
and	on	the	probability	of	being	unemployed,	thus	allowing	our	analysis	to	be	focused	on	
heterogeneity	in	the	returns	to	experience	depending	on	family	background.		
Following	Hudson	 and	 Sessions	 (2011),	we	 use	 the	 average	 years	 of	 education	 of	 the	
father	 and	 the	mother	 as	 proxy	 of	 family	 background.	 Because	 a	measure	 of	 parental	
earnings	 is	 absent	 in	 the	 EU‐SILC,	 education	 is	 usually	 considered	 the	 best	 proxy	 of	
parental	 characteristics	 (e.g.,	 Chevalier	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Although	 this	 proxy	 is	 less	
informative	 than	 parental	 income,	 it	 is	 the	 best	way	 to	 capture	 both	 parental	 earning	
potential	and	the	parental	capacity	 to	 transfer	human	capital.	Educational	attainments	
are	converted	to	years	of	education	to	be	parsimonious	and	estimate	a	single	coefficient.		
Our	sample	confirms	that	in	the	last	century,	Italy	experienced	a	clear	improvement	in	
its	population’s	educational	attainment	(Checchi	et	al.,	2013).	Compared	to	the	average	
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parental	 education,	 sons’	 education	 increased	 by	 4.52	 years	 (Table	 1).	 Looking	 at	 the	
marginal	distribution	of	the	highest	parental	degree	in	Table	2,	60.5%	achieved	at	most	
a	 primary	 degree,	 whereas	 only	 13.3%	 and	 2.4%	 attained,	 respectively,	 an	 upper	
secondary	and	a	tertiary	degree.	Conversely,	the	share	of	those	having	attained	at	most	a	
primary	degree	was	reduced	to	7.9%	in	the	children’s	generation,	whereas	the	shares	of	
upper	secondary	and	tertiary	graduates	rose,	respectively,	to	45.4%	and	7.7%.	However,	
in	spite	of	the	increase	in	educational	attainment,	the	association	between	parental	and	
children	 education	 remains	 large.	 Indeed,	 Table	 2	 shows	 that	 children’s	 education	 is	
highly	correlated	with	their	parents’	education.		
Table	3	presents	 the	descriptive	statistics	on	the	career	steps	of	children	with	parents	
with	different	education.	Because	children’s	years	of	education	steadily	 increases	with	
parental	education	(Column	1),	those	coming	from	a	worse	background	enter	the	labour	
market,	on	average,	at	a	lower	age	(Column	2).	However,	worse‐off	children	experience	
more	 frequent	 employment	 interruptions,	 as	 highlighted	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 gap	 in	
effective	 years	 of	 experience	 in	 the	 labour	market	 is	much	 lower	 than	 the	 gap	 in	 the	
entry	 age.	 For	 instance,	 children	 of	 tertiary	 graduates	 start	 to	 work,	 on	 average,	 4.5	
years	 later	 than	 children	 of	 primary	 educated	 parents,	 but	 the	 corresponding	 mean‐
distance	in	effective	experience	shrinks	to	1.4	years.		
	
3.	EARNINGS	GROWTH	BY	PARENTAL	BACKGROUND	
As	widely	recognised	in	both	theoretical	and	empirical	literature,	individual	wages	grow	
with	 labour	 market	 experience,	 and	 most	 importantly	 for	 the	 aims	 of	 this	 paper,	
experience‐earning	 profiles	 are	 steeper	 for	 highly	 skilled	workers.5	A	 large	 fraction	 of	
this	steeper	profile	 is	explained	by	endogenous	workers’	mobility	and	is	because,	over	
their	career,	high‐ability	workers	are	more	 likely	to	be	matched	with	more	productive	
firms.	Likewise,	a	steeper	experience‐earnings	profile	for	highly	skilled	workers	reflects	
differences	 in	 learning	 capacity	 between	 skilled	 and	 unskilled	 workers	 and	 the	
cumulative	nature	of	skill	formation	along	the	life	cycle.		
Parental	 background	 can	 cause	 returns	 to	 experience	 to	 be	 highly	 correlated	 with	
unobservable	worker	skills	and	the	connections	useful	 to	 find	a	good	 job.	However,	 to	
																																																													
5	See	Rubinstein	and	Weiss	(2006)	for	a	literature	review	of	the	theoretical	mechanism	and	the	empirical	
evidence	and	methods.		
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the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 and	with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 short	 paper	 of	 Hudson	 and	
Sessions	(2011),	no	studies	have	directly	investigated	the	effect	of	parental	background	
on	the	shape	of	the	experience‐earnings	profile.	
In	 the	empirical	 literature	on	 intergenerational	 inequality	 (Bjorklund	and	 Jantti,	2009;	
Blanden,	2013),	this	issue	has	been	addressed	indirectly	by	assessing	the	potential	life‐
cycle	 bias	 in	 the	 estimate	 of	 the	 intergenerational	 elasticity	 β	 between	 children’s	 and	
parents’	 incomes.	 In	 particular,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 an	 estimation	 bias	 is	 likely	 to	
emerge	because	 the	association	between	children’s	current	and	 lifetime	 income	varies	
over	the	life	cycle	when	reliable	measures	of	lifetime	incomes	are	difficult	to	retrieve	for	
both	 generations	 (Haider	 and	 Solon,	 2006;	Grawe,	 2006).6	The	usual	 rule	 of	 thumb	 to	
solve	this	problem	is	to	choose	an	age	for	which	the	difference	between	the	current	and	
lifetime	 income	 is	minimised,	which	 is	 approximately	 40	 years	 for	males	 (Haider	 and	
Solon,	 2006).	 However,	 Nybom	 and	 Stuhler	 (2011)	 have	 recently	 shown	 that	
approximating	 lifetime	 earnings	 based	 on	 annual	 earnings	 at	 a	 certain	 age	 does	 not	
remove	 the	 lifecycle	 bias	 because	 idiosyncratic	 deviations	 from	 average	 profiles	 are	
correlated	 with	 family	 background.	 Therefore,	 as	 heterogeneity	 in	 income	 profiles	 is	
intrinsically	dependent	on	family	background,	the	age	at	which	the	gap	between	annual	
and	 lifetime	 earnings	 is	 minimised	 crucially	 depends	 on	 family	 background	 itself,	
making	it	exceedingly	difficult	to	reduce	the	bias	in	the	β.		
This	paper	seeks	to	fill	this	gap	in	the	literature	and	directly	investigates	the	influence	of	
parental	 background	 on	 returns	 to	 experience.	 Before	 carrying	 out	 proper	 panel	
estimates	 (see	 next	 sections),	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 provide	 a	 preliminary	 descriptive	
picture	of	 the	 association	between	 children’s	 earnings	 and	parental	 background	along	
the	 career	 path.	 As	 stated	 in	 Section	 2,	 our	 dataset	 does	 not	 record	 information	 on	
parents’	 incomes;	 thus,	 the	 β	 elasticity	 cannot	 be	 properly	 estimated.	 However,	 we	
mimic	 these	 estimates	 using	 parents’	 education	 as	 proxy	 of	 background.	We	 let	 the	 β	
depend	on	experience	by	running	a	set	of	OLS	estimates	at	the	different	years	of	labour	
market	experience.	More	precisely,	we	use	our	pooled	panel	and	estimate	for	each	level	
of	experience	the	simple	relation:	
																																																													
6	Heterogeneity	in	earnings	growth	across	individuals	is	usually	considered	to	be	due	to	the	heterogeneity	
in	human	capital	investment.	Indeed,	the	estimates	of	the	intergenerational	elasticities	would	be	biased	if	
young	 children	 were	 observed	 because	 earnings	 profiles	 are	 steeper	 for	 more	 educated	 children	 and	
children’s	education	is	associated	to	parental	background.	
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	 	 log	ሺݓ୧୲ሻ ൌ α ൅ β ∙ ݌ܽݎ_݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ δ୲ ൅ ε୧; 			∀	݁ݔ݌	ሺ1, 25ሻ		 	 (eq.	1)	
where	log	ሺݓ௜௧ሻ	is	 log	 of	 gross	 weekly	 wage,	݌ܽݎ_݁݀ݑ௜	is	 parents’	 average	 years	 of	
education	and	δ୲	is	a	dummy	that	equals	one	if	the	individual	 i	has	reached	experience	
level	x	at	year	t.		
Figure	 1	 presents	 the	 estimates	 of	 equation	 (1)	 for	 each	 experience	 level.	 This	 figure	
clearly	shows	that:	1.	parental	background	is	associated	with	significantly	higher	weekly	
wages,	and	2.	the	estimated	β	increases	steadily	with	sons’	experience.	Remarkably,	this	
second	 finding	 indicates	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 parental	 background	 never	 declines	 or	
stabilises	 around	 a	 certain	 value.	 Rather,	 it	 continues	 to	 grow	 during	 the	 sons’	 entire	
career.	The	cumulative	nature	of	skill	formation	can	account	for	this	pattern	as	long	as	
children’s	 education	 is	 strongly	 dependent	 on	 their	 parents’	 education	 (Hertz	 et	 al.,	
2007).	
To	provide	preliminary	insights	on	this	hypothesis,	Figure	2	presents	the	results	of	the	
same	 regression	 augmented	 for	 the	 sons’	 own	education,	 also	measured	 in	 years.	The	
main	 result	 is	 that	 the	 β	 keeps	 increasing	 with	 children’s	 experience,	 although	 at	 a	
slower	pace	 than	that	shown	 in	Figure	1.	Also	note	 that	 in	 this	case,	 the	βs	are	always	
statistically	 significant.	 Returns	 to	 children’s	 education	 also	 increase	with	 experience,	
confirming	 the	 key	 role	 of	 cumulative	 skill	 formation	 (Cunha	 and	Heckman,	 2007).	 In	
turn,	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 direct	 effect	 of	 parental	 background	 when	 controlling	 for	
children’s	education	is	a	distinct	feature	of	all	unequal	European	countries	as	opposed	to	
more	 equal	 ones	 (Raitano	 and	 Vona,	 2015).	 This	 direct	 influence	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	
explain	 and	 requires	 further	 analyses	 to	 disentangle	 whether	 it	 depends	 on	
unobservable	abilities	or	other	mechanisms.		
In	 sum,	 our	 preliminary	 evidence	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 an	 irreducible	
heterogeneity	 in	 earning	 profiles,	 as	 dependent	 on	 both	 parents’	 and	 children’s	
education	(Nybom	and	Stuhler,	2011).	 In	next	section,	we	present	a	simple	conceptual	
framework	 to	 guide	 structured	 empirical	 analyses	 capable	 to	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	
mechanisms	 underpinning	 this	 persistent	 influence	 of	 parental	 education	 on	 sons’	
earnings.		
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4.	CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORK	AND	EMPIRICAL	STRATEGY	
Human	 capital	 accumulation	 is	 usually	 considered	 the	 main	 channel	 through	 which	
parental	 	background	influences	lifetime	earnings	(Becker	and	Tomes,	1979	and	1986;	
Solon,	 2004).	 Parental	 background	 is	 likely	 to	 affect	 human	 capital	 accumulation	
through	 different	 channels	 (e.g.,	 educational	 choices,	 peer	 effects,	 different	 schooling	
quality;	Benabou,	1996;	Dustmann,	2004;	Bratsberg	et	al.,	2007)	whose	 influence	may	
be	mediated	by	on‐going	educational	policies	(Schuetz	et	al.,	2008).	To	be	sure,	not	only	
do	well‐off	children	remain	longer	at	school	on	average	(Hertz	et	al.,	2007),	but	they	also	
outperform	other	children	in	test	scores	at	a	given	school	level	(Fuchs	and	Woessmann,	
2007)	 and	 benefit	more	 from	 extra‐schooling	 activities	 (Duncan	 and	Murnane,	 2011).	
More	 important,	 the	 cumulativeness	 in	 skill	 formation	 makes	 early‐age	 investments	
crucial	 (Cunha	 and	 Heckman,	 2007)	 and	 thus	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 that	 well‐off	
parents	have	a	persistent	influence	on	their	children’s	labour	market	outcomes	through	
a	better	learning	capacity.	This	early	life	influence	is	particularly	important	for	cognitive	
skills	 on	which	 labour	market	 success	 strongly	 depends.	 In	 addition	 to	 core	 cognitive	
skills,	parental	background	can	affect	children’s	labour	market	outcomes	in	other	ways.	
Indeed,	 well‐off	 parents	 transfer	 to	 their	 children	 soft	 skills	 and	 a	 network	 of	 social	
relations	 that	 could	 prove	 extremely	 useful	 in	 finding	 good	 jobs	 and	 reducing	 the	
unemployment	risk.		
The	empirical	identification	of	the	mechanisms	through	which	parental	background	can	
affect	children’s	labour	market	dynamics	and	earnings	is	exceedingly	difficult,	but	it	can	
be	facilitated	through	the	use	of	a	simple	illustrative	equation	governing	the	process	of	
skill	 formation.	Under	 a	 quite	 general	 assumption,	 such	 an	 equation	 helps	 distinguish	
between	 the	 two	 empirically	 unobservable	 components	 through	 which	 parental	
background	can	influence	children’s	earnings:	additional	cognitive	abilities	vs.	network	
and	social	relations.		
Let	us	assume	that	individual	skills,	ݏ௜,	are	an	additive	function	of	family	background,	ܾ௜,	
and	 of	 an	 idiosyncratic	 ability	 shock	 orthogonal	 to	 background,	ܽ௜.	 A	 general	 way	 to	
write	such	a	skill	production	function	is:		
																																																ݏ௜ ൌ ߜܾ௜ ൅ ߚܽ௜ ൅ ߛܽ௜ܾ௜	 	 	 																																							(eq.2)	
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where	ߜ, ߚ, ߛ	are	parameters	capturing	the	intensity	of,	respectively,	a	pure	background	
effect,	an	ability	effect	and	the	background	effect	conditional	on	children’s	ability.	In	line	
with	 leading	 research	on	 skill	 formation	 (e.g.,	 Cunha	and	Heckman,	2007),	Equation	1	
assumes	 that	ܾ௜	and	ܽ௜	are	 complements	 in	 the	 production	 function	 of	 skills	 and	 thus	
that	the	autonomous	effect	of	parental	background	on	skills	is	magnified	in	presence	of	
highly	 idiosyncratic	 abilities.	 When	 allowing	 skills	 to	 influence	 earnings	 dynamically	
through	learning	and	job	changes,	the	wage	of	individual	i	at	time	t	can	be	written	as:	
ݓ௜௧ ൌ ݏ௜ሺ1 ൅ ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ ሺߜଵܾ௜ ൅ ߜଶܾ௜݁௜௧ሻ ൅ ሺߚଵܽ௜ ൅ ߚଶܽ௜݁௜௧ሻ ൅ ሺߛଵܽ௜ܾ௜ ൅ ߛଶܽ௜ܾ௜݁௜௧ሻ					(eq.	3)	
where	labour	market	experience	݁௜௧	is	interacted	with	the	three	components	of	the	skill	
vector.	 The	 coefficients	 denoted	 with	 “1”	 capture	 the	 influence	 of	 skills	 on	 earning	
potential,	 whereas	 the	 coefficients	 denoted	 with	 “2”	 capture	 the	 influence	 along	 the	
working	career.	The	 latter	 typically	occurs	 through	on‐the‐job	 learning	and	(voluntary	
and	involuntary)	job	changes.		
Our	expectations	on	the	sign	of	the	coefficients	in	Equation	(3)	are	the	following.	First,	
the	pure	ability	effects	are	reasonably	expected	to	be	positive	and	significant.	Second,	we	
should	expect	to	observe	a	strong	complementarity	between	ability	and	background	in	
the	 accumulation	 of	 cognitive	 skills	 (Cunha	 and	Heckman,	 2007).	 This	 implies	 that	ߛଵ	
and	ߛଶ	are	both	expected	to	be	positive	and	significant.	Third,	under	the	assumption	of	
complementarity	 between	 background	 and	 ability,	 we	 should	 expect	 the	 autonomous	
background	 effects	ߜଵ	and	ߜଶ	to	 be	 near	 zero	 and	 statistically	 insignificant	 unless	
parental	background	exerts	a	strong	 influence	on	earnings	through	 family	connections	
and	inherited	social	capital.		
In	 Southern	 European	 countries,	 family	 ties	 and	 networks	 often	 play	 a	 major	 role	
(Checchi	et	al.,	1999;	Guell	 et	al.,	2007),	 affecting	 the	probability	of	 finding	a	good	 job	
and	other	 labour	market	 outcomes	 (Granovetter,	 2005).	For	 instance,	 family	networks	
can	ensure	good	jobs	to	low‐ability	individuals,	even	those	with	poor	levels	of	schooling	
or	 abilities	 (Raitano	 and	 Vona,	 2015).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 autonomous	 effect	 of	 parents'	
education	on	children’s	earnings	is	likely	to	be	positive	and	particularly	strong	along	the	
workers’	career	(i.e.,	ߜଶ ൐ 0).7		
																																																													
7	The	literature	on	the	influence	of	family	networks	in	the	labour	markets	is	growing	fast	(e.g.,	Pellizzari,	
2010;	Magruder,	2009;	Kramarz	and	Nordstrom	Skans,	2013;	Aina	and	Nicoletti,	2014;	Corak	and	Piraino,	
2011;	Marcenaro	 Gutierrez	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 However,	 this	 literature	 usually	 focuses	 on	 the	 probability	 of	
12 
 
The	 direct	 empirical	 counterpart	 of	 Equation	 (2)	 is	 the	 empirical	model	 proposed	 by	
Hudson	and	Sessions	 (2011),	which	has	 the	advantage	of	allowing	 the	 impact	of	work	
experience	 to	 explicitly	 depend	 on	 parental	 education.	 We	 estimate	 the	 following	
Mincerian	equation:	
																		log	ሺݓ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݃ሺ݁௜௧ሻ ൅ ݌ܽݎ_݁݀ݑ௜ሺ߮ଵ ൅ ߮ଶ݁௜௧ሻ ൅ ܆௜௧઺ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧	 														(eq.4)	
where	log	ሺݓ௜௧ሻ	is	 the	 log	 of	 weekly	wages8,	ߝ௜௧	is	 a	 standard	 error	 term,	܆௜௧	is	 a	 set	 of	
usual	 controls	 in	 wage	 equations9,	 and	݃ሺ݁௜௧ሻ	is	 a	 third‐order	 polynomial	 in	 effective	
experience	(measured	in	weeks),	i.e.,	∑ ߛ௝݁௜௧௝ଷ௝ୀଵ .	Our	main	coefficient	of	interest	is	that	of	
the	 interaction	 between	 parental	 background	 and	 experience,	 ො߮ଶ.	 This	 coefficient	
captures	 the	 labour	market	 effect	 of	 parental	 background,	while	 ො߮ଵ	reflects	 the	 better	
earning	potential	of	well‐off	children,	independently	of	their	experience.		
The	structure	of	our	data	allows	us	to	expand	upon	Hudson	and	Sessions’	specification	
in	 two	 important	 ways.	 First,	 our	 very	 accurate	measurement	 of	 effective	 experience	
greatly	reduces	the	measurement	error	bias	that	affects	the	estimates	of	the	interaction	
between	experience	and	parents’	education.	Second,	we	can	exploit	the	panel	dimension	
to	 include	 individual	 effects	ߤ௜.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 individual	 effects	 mitigate	 the	 usual	
concern	that	the	influence	of	unobservable	skills	may	result	in	a	biased	estimation	of	 ො߮ଶ	
because	 these	 unobservable	 skills	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 correlated	 with	 lifetime	 earning	
potential	and	parents’	education.		
As	 a	 further	 departure	 from	 Hudson	 and	 Sessions’	 specification,	 we	 also	 estimate	
Equation	(4)	including	children’s	education	and	an	interaction	term	between	children’s	
education	and	experience.	This	allows	us	to	distinguish	between	a	direct	effect	and	an	
indirect	effect	of	parents’	education,	acting	through	formal	education.	Because	we	expect	
children’s	 education	 to	be	more	 strongly	 correlated	with	effective	workers’	 skills	 than	
parents’	 education,	 this	 augmented	 version	 of	 Eq.	 4	 represents	 a	 starting	 point	 to	
interpret	our	coefficients	of	interest.	Alternatively,	we	distinguish	between	fathers’	and	
mothers’	 education	under	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 former	 is	more	 strongly	 correlated	
																																																																																																																																																																																														
finding	a	good	 job	 through	self‐reported	 family	help,	whereas	 in	 this	paper,	we	 investigate	 the	effect	of	
family	background	on	earnings.		
8	In	the	Appendix,	we	show	that	our	results	hold	using	annual	earnings	as	the	dependent	variable.		
9	In	the	baseline	model,	the	vector	X	contains	the	following	variables:	age,	age	squared,	number	of	weeks	
worked	in	the	year,	dummy	for	part‐time	work	in	the	week,	regional	dummies,	cohort	dummies	and	year	
dummies.	In	augmented	specifications,	we	also	include	sector	dummies	and	the	log	of	firm	size	(available	
in	the	dataset	since	1987),	tenure	and	other	proxies	of	worker	history	(i.e.,	white	collar	dummy,	periods	
spent	receiving	unemployment	subsidies	or	being	temporarily	suspended	by	the	employer).		
13 
 
with	 family	 networks	 and	 labour	market	 nepotism	 and	 the	 latter	with	 abilities	 (Chen	
and	 Feng,	 2009).	 However,	 although	 these	 augmented	 specifications	 offer	 interesting	
insights,	 it	 appears	 difficult	 to	 believe	 that	 individual	 abilities	 are	 fully	 captured	 by	
either	mothers’	or	children’s	education.		
Along	the	lines	proposed	by	Raitano	and	Vona	(2015),	a	first	direct	approach	to	address	
these	 issues	 consists	 of	 using	 the	difference	 in	 the	 educational	 attainments	 of	parents	
and	sons	to	build	groups	with	different	ability‐background	combinations.	The	idea	is	to	
use	 intergenerational	 educational	 mobility	 to	 distinguish	 between	 two	 types	 of	
background‐related	 effects.	 The	 first	 type	 emerges	 because	 there	 is	 complementarity	
between	 ability	 and	 parental	 background,	 and	 it	 implies	 that	well‐off	 children	 should	
have	 a	 better	 endowment	 of	 unobservable	 skills	 in	 correspondence	 to	 high	 levels	 of	
education	 (a	glass	ceiling	effect).	The	second	 type	 is	associated	with	 insurance	 for	 the	
children	of	well‐educated	parents	who	fail	in	achieving	a	high	qualification	(a	parachute	
effect).	Our	partial	identification	comes	from	the	fact	that	a	glass	ceiling	effect	is	likely	to	
depend	 on	 both	 family	 networks	 and	 abilities	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Macmillan	 et	 al.,	 2013).	
Conversely,	 it	 is	hard	to	believe	that	the	parachute	effect	can	be	associated	with	better	
abilities;	 hence,	 in	 this	 case,	 family	networks	 should	be	of	paramount	 importance.	We	
implement	this	idea	by	estimating	the	following	equation:	
log	ሺݓ௜௧ሻ ൌ ෍ߙ௞1ሼ௣௔௥	௘ௗ௨ୀ௝ሽ
௄ୀଽ
௜௝
1ሼ௘ௗ௨ୀ௜ሽ ൅ ෍ߴ௞
௄ୀଽ
௜௝
1ሼ௣௔௥	௘ௗ௨ୀ௝ሽ1ሼ௘ௗ௨ୀ௜ሽ݁௜௧ …	
													൅݃ሺ݁ݔ݌௜௧ሻ ൅ ܆௜௧઺ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧		 																														(eq.5)	
where	both	j	(for	parents)	and	i	(for	children)	have	three	modalities:	low	education	(L),	
middle	 education	 (M)	 and	high	education	 (H).	We	hence	distinguish	nine	parent‐child	
pairs	 (HH,	 HM,	 HL,	 MH,	 MM,	 ML,	 LH,	 LM,	 and	 LL)	 and	 allow	 the	 experience‐earning	
profiles	 to	 be	 pair	 specific.	 For	 sons,	 the	 three	 groups	 are	 tertiary	 qualifications	 (H),	
upper	secondary	qualification	(M)	and	less	than	upper	secondary	qualifications	(L).	To	
define	 the	 three	 correspondent	 groups	 for	 parents,	 observe	 that	 the	 mean	 education	
attainment	changed	dramatically	between	the	two	generations,	reflecting	both	changes	
in	 the	 economic	 structure	 and	 reforms	 in	 compulsory	 education	 (see	 Table	 2).	
Consistently,	we	consider	as	highly	educated	those	parents	who	have	at	least	an	upper	
secondary	 degree.	 Lower	 secondary	 graduates	 represent	 the	middle	 group,	 and	 those	
with	primary	education	represent	the	lowest	group.		
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Let	us	make	a	 few	examples	 to	understand	how	these	groups	can	provide	 insight	 into	
the	sign	and	the	magnitude	of	the	effects	mentioned	in	Equation	2.	Children	with	LH	and	
MH	 substantially	 improve	 with	 parent	 outcomes,	 and	 thus,	 they	 should	 have	 high	
idiosyncratic	 abilities	ܽ௜	and	 low	ܾ௜.	 For	 the	 group	 HH,	 instead,	 ability‐background	
complementarity	 is	 expected	 to	be	magnified.	 Finally,	 for	downward	movers	 (i.e.,	HM,	
HL,	 ML),	 it	 is	 primarily	 parental	 background	ܾ௜	that	 should	 matter.	 A	 reward	 for	
downward	movers	compared	to	stayers	is	then	likely	to	reflect	better	parental	networks	
rather	than	individual	abilities.		
A	 second	and	more	 conventional	 approach	 to	disentangle	 the	 two	background‐related	
effects	consists	of	conditioning	the	estimated	coefficients	on	ability.	Quantile	regressions	
allow	 the	 effects	 of	 interest	 to	 vary	 depending	 on	 individual	 abilities.	 We	 estimate	
Equation	(3)	using	the	quantile	fixed	effect	approach	proposed	by	Canay	(2011).	Using	
this	 approach,	 not	 only	 is	 our	 main	 effect	 of	 interest	 (i.e.,	߮ଶ)	 allowed	 to	 depend	 on	
abilities,	 but	we	 can	also	 account	 for	 time‐invariant	unobservable	 skills.	Although	 this	
specification	 does	 not	 consent	 to	 directly	 recollecting	 the	 structural	 coefficients	 of	
Equation	(2),	it	provides	indirect	evidence	of	the	importance	of	the	various	mechanisms	
at	work.	The	coefficients	associated	with	the	polynomial	in	experience	fully	capture	the	
interaction	 between	 idiosyncratic	 abilities	 and	 experience.	 In	 turn,	 the	 estimated	
coefficient	 ො߮ଶ;௔೔	is	 the	sum	of	 the	structural	parameters	ߜଶ	and	ߛଶ.	 Inspecting	the	shape	
of	the	function	 ො߮ଶ;௔೔,	we	can	infer	the	relative	magnitude	(and	the	statistical	significance)	
of	these	two	coefficients.	If	a	positive	and	significant	 ො߮ଶ;௔೔	is	observed	in	correspondence	
to	low	values	of	ܽ௜,	it	is	likely	that	family	connections	ensure	a	parachute	to	low‐ability	
individuals	 with	 good	 family	 background.	 If	 ො߮ଶ;௔೔	is	 increasing	 with	ܽ௜,	 a	 glass	 ceiling	
effect	 for	 high‐ability	 individuals	 with	 good	 background	 gradually	 emerge	 along	 the	
career	path.	Recall	that	if	networks	matter,	their	effects	should	be	displayed	particularly	
during	 the	 working	 career,	 and	 hence,	 ො߮ଶ;௔೔	is	 expected	 to	 be	 positive	 and	 significant	
along	the	entire	ability	distribution.		
In	the	final	step	of	our	empirical	analysis,	we	investigate	whether	the	bulk	of	the	effect	of	
parental	 education	on	 the	earning‐experience	profile	depends	on	 learning‐by‐doing	as	
opposed	 to	 endogenous	 job	 mobility.	 This	 exercise	 represents	 another	 way	 to	
disentangle	the	mechanisms	at	work.	By	way	of	example,	if	well‐off	children	can	benefit	
from	 better	 connections,	 they	 are	 either	 more	 likely	 to	 find	 better	 jobs	 during	 their	
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career	 or	 to	 reduce	 the	 harmful	 consequences	 of	 involuntary	 displacement.	 However,	
our	data	do	not	allow	us	to	distinguish	between	voluntary	and	involuntary	job	changes	
by	 exploiting	 some	 source	 of	 exogenous	 worker	 displacements,	 such	 as	 firm	 closure	
(Dustmann	and	Meghir,	2005),	and	thus,	the	result	of	this	exercise	should	be	interpreted	
with	caution.	Bearing	 in	mind	 these	 limitations,	we	re‐estimate	Equation	(4)	 including	
the	 interactions	of	parental	background	with	experience,	number	of	 firm	changes	 and	
previous	 unemployment	 spells.	 The	 new	 interactions	 of	 parents’	 education	 with	 past	
unemployment	 and	 number	 of	 firm	 changes	 allow	 us	 to	 distinguish	 the	 influence	 of	
parents’	education	on	the	job	opportunities	faced	after	an	involuntary	change	and	after	a	
voluntary	change,	respectively.		
	
5.	ESTIMATION	RESULTS	
The	organisation	of	the	results	section	reflects	the	two	goals	of	this	paper.	The	first	part	
is	 devoted	 to	 providing	 new	 evidence	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 parental	 education	
and	 experience.	 Our	main	 novelty	 is	 the	 use	 of	 panel	 data	 techniques	 to	 unravel	 the	
crucial	 importance	 of	 family	 background	 on	workers’	 experience‐earning	 profile.	 Our	
estimates	question	the	reliability	of	empirical	specifications	that	neglect	the	influence	of	
family	background	along	the	workers’	entire	career.	The	second	part	 is	novel	 in	that	it	
represents	the	first	attempt	to	disentangle	the	mechanisms	that	lead	to	a	positive	effect	
of	parental	background	on	experience‐earning	profiles.	To	focus	on	the	main	message	of	
the	 paper,	 we	 will	 present	 tables	 with	 only	 the	 coefficients	 of	 parental	 background	
variables.10		
5.1	INFLUENCE	OF	PARENTS’	EDUCATION	ALONG	THE	CAREER	PATH	
Table	4	reports	 the	estimates	of	Equation	(3).	Column	1	presents	a	simple	benchmark	
model	 that	 is	 estimated	without	 including	 the	 interaction	 between	parents’	 education	
and	experience.	We	estimate	Equation	(3)	using	either	a	random	(Column	2)	or	a	fixed	
(Column	3)	effect	model.	The	former	approach	allows	us	to	recollect	the	time‐invariant	
effect	of	parents’	education	and	to	compare	it	with	the	effect	of	parents’	education	after	
labour	 market	 entry.	 The	 latter	 approach	 is	 more	 general	 in	 that	 it	 relaxes	 the	
assumption	 of	 independence	 between	 covariates	 and	 individual	 effects.	 For	 these	
																																																													
10	Results	for	other	covariates	can	be	provided	by	the	authors	upon	request.		
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reasons,	we	will	 keep	 comparing	 the	RE	and	 the	FE	model	 throughout	 this	 section.	 In	
columns	4	and	5,	we	restrict	our	estimates	to	the	cohort	of	people	who	started	to	work	
in	 the	 decade	 1980‐1989	 (and	 had	 at	 least	 twenty	 years	 of	 experience	 in	 2009).	 This	
restriction	 reassures	 us	 that	 the	 results	 are	not	 driven	by	 young	 individuals	with	 low	
experience	levels.		
The	first	notable	result	is	that	parents’	education	has	a	substantial	and	significant	effect	
on	 the	 experience‐earning	 profiles	 of	 Italian	 males.	 The	 effect	 is	 particularly	 stable	
across	 specification,	 decreasing	 by	 only	 6.5%	when	 considering	 the	 restricted	 cohort.	
The	 point	 estimate	 is	 quite	 large;	 a	 1	 year	 increase	 in	 both	 experience	 and	 parents’	
education	 generates	 a	 0.16%	 earning	 advantage,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 13.2%	 of	 the	
autonomous	 effect	 of	 parental	 background	 (see	 Table	 5).11	However,	 the	 relative	
magnitude	of	 the	 two	effects	 changes	as	 experience	 grows.	 In	panel	 1	 of	Table	5,	 it	 is	
evident	that	a	5‐year	increase	in	parental	education	leads	to	a	22.2%	earnings	increase	
when	 the	 child	 reaches	 20	 years	 of	 experience.	 Of	 this	 effect,	 only	 27.3%	 can	 be	
attributed	to	the	time‐invariant	component	of	the	parental	education	effect.		
The	 second	 result	 is	 that	 the	 autonomous	 effect	 of	 parents’	 education	 on	 the	 earning	
potential	 remains	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 at	 a	 conventional	 level	 when	
including	 the	 interaction	 between	 parents’	 education	 and	 experience.	 This	 result	
corroborates	 our	 claim	 that	 parental	 background	 plays	 a	 role	 on	 both	 phases	 of	 the	
children’s	life‐cycle,	pre‐	and	post‐labour	market	entry.		
Less	obvious	 is	the	third	result,	which	emerges	from	the	comparison	of	the	FE	and	RE	
model.	Remarkably,	both	the	FE	and	the	RE	model	deliver	nearly	identical	estimates	of	
the	 effect	 of	 parents’	 education	 on	 the	 earnings	 profile.	 This	 has	 two	 important	
implications.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 individual	 effects	 are	 uncorrelated	 with	 experience,	
irrespective	 of	 the	 estimator	 used	 (FE	 vs.	 RE).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 RE	 and	 the	 FE	
model	are	equivalent	in	estimating	our	main	effects	of	interest.	Therefore,	the	RE	model	
can	 be	 safely	 used	 in	 comparing	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 parental	 background	 effect	 at	
different	stages	of	the	working	career.		
This	set	of	results	has	two	important	implications	for	the	literature	on	intergenerational	
income	elasticity	and	social	mobility	 in	general.	First,	 it	raises	serious	concerns	on	the	
reliability	of	empirical	models	 that	assume	the	 influence	of	parental	background	 to	be	
																																																													
11	Recall	that	experience	is	measured	in	weeks.	
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independent	of	labour	market	histories.	Second,	it	lends	support	to	the	finding	of	Nybom	
and	Stuhler	(2011)	 that	 life‐cycle	biases	 in	estimations	of	 intergenerational	elasticities	
are	 unlikely	 to	 be	minimised	 in	 correspondence	 to	 any	 specific	 point	 of	 the	 working	
career	because	deviations	from	average	profiles	are	correlated	with	family	background.		
The	first	four	Columns	of	Table	6	replicate	the	analysis	of	Table	4,	including	among	the	
covariates	son's	education	and	the	interaction	between	son's	education	and	experience.	
This	 allows	 us	 to	 distinguish	 between	 a	 direct	 and	 an	 indirect	 effect	 of	 parents’	
education	on	earnings.	Noteworthy	is	that	the	direct	effects	of	parental	education	halve	
but	 remain	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 99%	 level	when	we	 control	 for	
formal	 education.	 In	 addition,	 returns	 to	 experience	 are	 significantly	higher	 for	highly	
educated	 sons.	 The	 quantifications	 presented	 in	 Table	 5	 highlight	 that	 a	 one‐year	
increase	 in	both	children’s	and	parents’	education	 leads	to	a	sizeable	wage	 increase	of	
7.3%	 (5%	 for	 children’s	 education	 vs.	 2.3%	 for	 parents’	 education),	 whereas	 the	
corresponding	increase	estimated	in	Model	1	for	parental	education	is	4.4%.		
In	last	two	columns	of	Table	6,	we	distinguish	between	mothers’	and	fathers’	influence	
on	their	children’s	earnings.	Recent	literature	suggests	that	fathers’	education	stands	for	
family	ties	useful	to	find	a	good	job;	thus,	it	is	a	candidate	proxy	for	ܾ௜	in	eq.	2.	Mothers’	
education	appears	to	be	a	good	proxy	of	children’s	unobservable	ability	once	controlling	
for	 formal	 education	 (e.g.,	 Altonji	 and	 Dunn,	 1996).	 Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 both	
fathers’	 and	 mothers’	 educational	 attainments	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 children’s	
working	 careers,	 and	 no	 significant	 differences	 among	 paternal	 and	 maternal	
coefficients	 emerge.	 The	 paternal	 and	 maternal	 effects	 are	 significant	 for	 earning	
potential	and	 in	making	returns	to	experience	steeper.	 In	spite	of	 its	 intrinsic	 interest,	
the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 exercise	 is	 capable	 of	 identifying	 network	 and	 background‐
related	 ability	 effects	 is	 limited	 because	 it	 hinges	 upon	 the	 strong	 assumption	 of	 a	
perfect	correspondence	between	paternal	and	maternal	influences,	on	the	one	hand,	and	
these	two	mechanisms,	on	the	other.		
As	 a	 corollary	 of	 this	 first	 set	 of	 results,	 it	 is	worth	 noticing	 the	 size	 of	 the	 estimated	
effects	 is	 very	 robust	 to	 the	 inclusion	 of	 additional	 individual	 and	 sectorial	 controls,	
interacting	 both	 parents’	 and	 children’s	 education	with	 the	 third‐order	 polynomial	 in	
experience	or	using	annual	earnings	as	a	dependent	variable.	Tables	1A,	2A	and	3A	 in	
the	Appendix	contain	these	results	in	full	detail.	
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5.2	DISENTANGLING	THE	MECHANISMS		
The	second	part	of	this	section	seeks	to	disentangle	the	sources	of	the	lifetime	effect	of	
parents’	 education	 more	 rigorously.	 Following	 our	 empirical	 strategy,	 we	 report	 the	
estimation	results	for	Equation	4	in	Table	7.	Estimated	coefficients	are	reported	for	both	
the	FE	and	the	RE	models,	which	again	are	very	similar.	The	results	contained	in	Table	7	
clearly	 indicate	the	co‐existence	of	a	parachute	and	a	glass	ceiling	effect.	Furthermore,	
remarkably,	both	components	of	 the	parental	background	effect	are	active	 in	different	
phases	of	the	children’s	career.	
Let	us	first	observe	what	happens	for	highly	educated	sons	where	the	glass	ceiling	effect	
emerges.	 Highly	 educated	 sons	 with	 highly	 educated	 parents	 (HH)	 earn	 significantly	
more	than	highly	educated	sons	from	less	advantaged	family	backgrounds	parents,	 i.e.,	
those	 with	 middle	 (MH)	 or	 lower	 parental	 education	 (LH);	 this	 group	 shows	 not	
significant	advantage	with	respect	to	the	reference	group	MM.	The	advantage	of	the	HH	
group	over	the	other	two	groups	is	statistically	significant,	as	shown	by	the	Wald	tests	in	
Table	 8.	 The	 overall	 magnitude	 of	 the	 glass	 ceiling	 effect	 is	 large:	 at	 twenty	 years	 of	
experience,	 the	 HH	 group	 had	 earned	 20.6	 and	 27.4	 percentage	 points	 more	 than,	
respectively,	the	MH	and	LH	group.	The	emergence	of	a	glass	ceiling	effect	is	in	line	with	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 complementarity	 between	 parental	 background	 and	 ability,	 which	
previous	 research	 has	 shown	 to	 be	 widespread	 across	 eight	 European	 countries	
representative	of	different	welfare	regimes	(Raitano	and	Vona,	2015).	
The	parachute	effect	 is	observed	 in	correspondence	of	both	middle	 (M)	and	 lower	 (L)	
educational	levels,	and	it	is	clearly	amplified	along	the	working	career.	The	well‐off	sons	
still	gain	a	significant	earning	advantage	over	the	worse‐off	sons,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	
they	 achieve	 a	 lower	 (adjusted	 for	 structural	 change)	 educational	 level	 than	 their	
parents.	In	the	group	of	high	school	graduates,	for	instance,	the	earning	advantage	of	HM	
at	 twenty	 years	 of	 experience	 is	 14.7	 percentage	 points	 with	 respect	 to	 LM	 and	 9.4	
percentage	points	with	respect	to	reference	group	MM.	Note	that	the	two	corresponding	
effects	 at	 zero	 experience	 were	 considerably	 smaller:	 4.7	 and	 2.3	 percentage	 points,	
respectively.	 The	 parachute	 effect	 emerges	 even	 for	 sons	 with	 primary	 or	 lower	
secondary	education.	There,	 sons	of	 less	 educated	parents	 (LL)	 experience	an	earning	
penalty	of	approximately	8	percentage	points	after	 twenty	years	of	work	compared	to	
sons	with	more	educated	parents	(ML	and	HL).	Therefore,	although	the	parachute	effect	
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seems	slightly	smaller	than	the	glass	ceiling	effect,	it	still	creates	a	substantial	wedge	in	
the	career	prospects	of	individuals	with	different	parental	backgrounds.		
Figure	3	displays	the	results	of	the	quantile	fixed	effect	regressions,	which	represent	a	
more	 conventional	 method	 to	 disentangle	 the	 different	 mechanisms	 at	 work.	 We	
estimate	both	Model	1	and	Model	2	to	compare	how	the	inclusion	of	children’s	education	
affects	 the	 coefficients	 of	 parents’	 education	 along	 the	 ability	 distribution.	 The	 results	
fully	confirm	our	previous	findings.	In	both	Models,	returns	to	experience	are	steeper	for	
well‐off	children	with	high	abilities.	However,	the	estimated	coefficients	are	statistically	
significant	along	the	entire	distribution,	suggesting	that	parents'	education	also	has	an	
influence	 on	 the	 earning	 prospects	 of	 low‐ability	 individuals.	 In	 line	 with	 previous	
findings,	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 parental	 education	 effect	 is	 reduced	by	half	when	we	
include	the	interaction	between	experience	and	children’s	education.	Note	that	for	both	
models,	 the	 effects	 at	 the	 median	 are	 perfectly	 in	 line	 with	 those	 estimated	 using	
standard	panel	data	techniques.	Overall,	we	find	clear	support	for	our	main	finding	of	a	
widespread	effect	of	parents’	education	on	 the	earning‐experience	profile,	 irrespective	
of	sons’	abilities.		
A	 final	caveat	 is	 in	order	at	this	point.	Although	the	results	of	 this	sub‐section	indicate	
family	 connections	 as	 main	 candidate	 explanation	 to	 account	 for	 the	 influence	 of	
parental	background	at	the	bottom	of	the	ability	distribution,	we	cannot	fully	discharge	
the	 role	played	by	occupation‐specific	 skills	 in	 the	 transmission	of	occupational	 status	
across	generations.12	However,	we	can	be	confident	that	this	role	has	a	minor	influence	
at	 least	 on	 the	 parachute	 effect.	 First,	 we	 do	 not	 consider	 self‐employed	workers	 for	
whom	the	transmission	of	occupational‐specific	skills	and	experience	plays	a	major	role.	
Second,	the	parachute	effect	occurs	by	definition	in	low‐	and	medium‐paid	occupations	
where	human	capital	(included	specific	human	capital)	is	relatively	less	important.	As	a	
result,	 although	 the	 glass	 ceiling	 effect	 may	 partially	 capture	 the	 intergenerational	
transfer	 of	 specific	 skills	 in	 certain	 occupations,	 the	 same	 is	 difficult	 to	 say	 for	 the	
intergenerational	 influence	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 ability	 distribution,	 where	 those	
performing	low‐paid	occupations	are	arguably	concentrated.		
																																																													
12	In	the	EU‐SILC,	we	have	information	on	the	main	two‐digit	ISCO	occupation	performed	by	both	parents	
(20	in	total).	However,	such	detailed	occupational	categories	are	available	for	sons	only	in	2005	and	thus	
are	unreliable	to	identify	the	main	job	performed	throughout	the	career.		
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A	further	way	to	investigate	the	avenues	through	which	parental	background	improves	
children’s	lifetime	prospects	is	to	decompose	the	workers’	histories	into	three	different	
events:	unemployment	spells,	 firm	changes	and	 total	work	experience.	Unemployment	
spells	 are	 defined	 as	 periods	 of	 consecutive	 unemployment	 longer	 than	 three	months	
and	are	hence	a	proxy	of	 involuntary	displacement	(our	sample	is	composed	of	prime‐
age	men,	who	typically	have	high	participation	rates),	whereas	job‐to‐job	changes	are	a	
proxy	 of	 voluntary	 job	 changes.	 We	 then	 enrich	 our	 basic	 specification	 of	 Model	 2,	
including	 the	 interaction	 of	 parents’	 education	 with,	 respectively,	 the	 number	 of	 job	
changes	and	a	dummy	when	an	unemployment	spell	occurs.	Arguably,	a	well‐connected	
parent	is	 likely	to	be	more	successful	 in	helping	his/her	son	to	find	a	better	 job	rather	
than	to	ensure	better	career	prospects	within	the	same	job.	Therefore,	the	influence	of	
family	 networks	 should	 be	well‐approximated	 by	 the	 interaction	 between	 job	 change	
and	parental	background.	In	turn,	once	depurated	from	these	new	terms,	the	interaction	
between	parents’	education	and	experience	can	be	interpreted	as	a	proxy	of	on‐the‐job	
learning.		
Table	9	shows	a	descriptive	picture	of	the	way	in	which	parental	background	influences	
these	 two	 labour	market	 outcomes.	 The	number	 of	 firm	 changes	 depends	 on	parents’	
and	children’s	education;	it	is	higher	for	less	educated	child	from	disadvantaged	family	
backgrounds.	 The	 same	 pattern	 can	 be	 observed	 for	 the	 share	 of	 weeks	 in	
unemployment	 since	 the	 entry	 in	 the	 labour	market,	which	 is	 considerably	 higher	 for	
less	 educated	 individuals	 from	 disadvantaged	 backgrounds	 (Columns	 3‐4).	 One	 can	
hence	conclude	that	as	expected,	parental	background	affects	children’s	probabilities	of	
being	unemployed	and	of	finding	a	new	job.		
Table	10	lends	support	to	this	interpretation.	In	Columns	1	(RE)	and	3	(FE),	the	positive	
interaction	between	the	number	of	firm	changes	and	parental	background	indicates	that	
well‐off	 children	 change	 firms	 less	 frequently,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 have	 more	
success	 in	 finding	better	 jobs.	The	same	result	holds	 for	children’s	education,	and	 it	 is	
likely	to	reflect	the	better	outside	options	of	high‐ability	individuals.	Notably,	the	usual	
interaction	 term	 between	 experience	 and	 parents’	 education	 decreases	 by	 only	 25%	
with	respect	to	our	previous	estimates.	This	finding	implies	that	both	an	endogenous	job	
change	 effect	 and	 a	 learning	 effect	 are	 active	 in	 shaping	 the	 steeper	 returns	 to	
experience	of	well‐off	sons.	The	inclusion	of	the	interaction	between	the	unemployment	
21 
 
dummy	 and	 experience	 discards	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 additional	 channel.	 Whereas	
children	of	parents	with	higher	 education	have	 a	higher	 likelihood	of	 being	 employed	
conditional	on	their	own	education,	this	condition	does	not	significantly	affect	the	wage	
gains	or	 losses	 that	 follow	a	 long	period	out	of	 the	workforce.	The	opposite	cannot	be	
said	 for	 children’s	 own	 education,	 which	 worsen	 the	 wage	 losses	 associated	 with	 an	
unemployment	spell.13	
Overall,	 this	 additional	 empirical	 exercise	 indicates	 that	 job‐to‐job	 transitions	 are	 an	
important	 channel	 of	 intergenerational	 persistency.	 This	 evidence	 is	 clearly	 not	
conclusive	on	the	relative	importance	of	family	networks	and	learning	in	the	process	of	
intergenerational	 transmission.	However,	when	combined	with	 the	previous	 results	of	
this	section,	we	can	be	more	confident	in	interpreting	the	positive	job	change	effect	for	
well‐off	sons	as	dependent,	at	least	partially,	on	family	networks	rather	than	uniquely	on	
unobservable	abilities.		
	
6.	CONCLUSIONS	
This	paper	provides	new	evidence	on	the	influence	of	parental	background	along	their	
sons’	working	career.	We	find	that	parental	background	continues	to	exert	a	significant	
direct	influence	on	sons’	earnings	after	twenty‐five	years	of	their	career	and	even	when	
we	condition	our	estimates	to	both	the	observable	and	unobservable	characteristics	of	
sons.	 Our	 favourite	 point	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 the	 parental	 background	 effect	 at	
twenty	 years	 of	 experience	 ranges	 between	 11.7%	 (when	 controlling	 for	 sons’	
education)	 and	 22.2%.	 More	 than	 2/3	 of	 this	 effect	 is	 formed	 on	 the	 labour	 market	
rather	 than	 being	 dependent	 on	 an	 initial	 advantage.	 We	 also	 show	 that	 parental	
background	shifts	upward	the	experience‐earnings	profiles	through	two	mechanisms:	a	
glass	 ceiling	 effect	 for	 high‐ability	 individuals,	 due	 to	 the	 complementarity	 between	
background	 and	 son's	 idiosyncratic	 abilities,	 and	 a	 parachute	 effect	 for	 low‐ability	
individuals,	associated	with	better	labour	market	connections.			
Whereas	the	glass	ceiling	effect	is,	to	a	certain	extent,	an	unavoidable	consequence	of	the	
process	of	skill	 formation,	 the	parachute	effect	may	 indicate	a	distortion	 in	 the	way	 in	
																																																													
13	Our	findings	do	not	change	if	we	distinguish	experiences	as	private	employees	or	other	types	of	work	
(e.g.,	 self‐employed	 or	 public	 employees)	 and	 interact	 both	 types	 of	 experiences	 with	 children’s	 and	
parents’	education	(see	Table	A.4	in	the	Appendix).	
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which	the	Italian	labour	market	allocates	talents	to	jobs.	The	perceived	unfairness	that	
results	 from	 this	 imperfect	 functioning	 of	 the	 labour	 market	 can	 discourage	 human	
capital	 investments	 of	 disadvantaged	 children,	 and	 thus,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 harmful	
consequences	 for	 economic	 growth.	 Future	 research	 is	 required	 to	 investigate	 these	
channels	 in	 greater	 detail,	 for	 example,	 exploiting	 labour	 and	 product	 market	
liberalisations	 that	 have	 arguably	 changed	 sectorial	 quasi‐rents	 and	 thus	 returns	 to	
abilities	as	opposed	to	family	connections.		
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TABLES	AND	FIGURES	
	
Tab.	1:	Sample	descriptive	statistics1	
Child	years	of	education	 10.55	
[3.40]	
Parental	years	of	education	(average	both	parents)	 6.03	
[2.89]	
Parental	years	of	education	(best	parent	only)	 6.78	
[3.51]	
Gap	between	child	and	average	parental	education	 4.52	
[3.39]	
Gap	between	child	and	best	parent	education	 3.77	
[3.73]	
Real	weekly	wage	(Euro	2010)	 495.6	
[247.8]	
Real	weekly	wage	(logs)	 6.10	
[0.44]	
Age	 31.1	
[8.8]	
Experience	 9.9	
[7.7]	
Tenure	 5.2	
[5.2]	
Number	of	firm	changes	 2.4	
[2.3]	
Number	of	individual	obs.	 15.2	
[8.8]	
Sampled	individuals	 5,774	
Total	number	of	observations	 88,004	
1Mean	values,	standard	deviation	in	parenthesis.		
Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data		
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Tab.	2:	Mobility	table	of	highest	parental	and	child	education	(row	percentages)1	
Child	education	
Highest	parental		
education	
Less	than		
primary	 Primary	 Lower	sec.	 Upper	sec.	 Tertiary	 Total	
Parental	
educ.	
Less	than	primary	 3.1	 22.1	 51.5	 22.1	 1.1	 100.0	 9.4	
Primary	 0.4	 8.8	 46.9	 40.3	 3.7	 100.0	 51.1	
Lower	secondary	 0.2	 1.8	 34.1	 54.8	 9.3	 100.0	 22.8	
Upper	secondary	 0.3	 1.6	 14.4	 65.8	 18.0	 100.0	 13.3	
Tertiary	 0.0	 2.1	 5.7	 45.7	 46.4	 100.0	 2.4	
Child	educ.	 0.6	 7.3	 39.1	 45.4	 7.7	 100.0	 100.0	
1	Computed	on	individual	observations	(i.e.	one	observation	for	each	individual).		
Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
	
	
Tab.	3:	Average	years	of	education,	entry	age	and	average	years	of	experience,	by	parental	education	
Highest	parental		
education	 Years	of	education1	 Entry	age	as	a	private	employee1	 Years	of	experience2	
Less	than	primary	 8.2	 21.5	 10.2	
Primary	 9.8	 20.3	 10.5	
Lower	secondary	 11.4	 21.0	 9.1	
Upper	secondary	 12.8	 22.4	 8.8	
Tertiary	 14.5	 24.8	 9.1	
Total	 10.6	 21.0	 9.9	
1	Computed	 on	 individual	 observations	 (i.e.	 one	 observation	 for	 each	 individual).	 2	Computed	 on	
longitudinal	observations.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
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Fig.	1:	OLS	estimated	returns	to	parental	education	by	years	of	experience1	
	
1	Log	 of	weekly	 gross	wage	 (at	 constant	 prices)	 is	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 Estimates	 are	 obtained	
controlling	for	a	set	of	dummies	that	are	equal	one	if	the	individual	i	has	reached	experience	x	at	year	
t.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
	
Fig.	2:	OLS	estimated	returns	to	child	and	parental	education	by	years	of	experience1	
	
1	Log	 of	weekly	 gross	wage	 (at	 constant	 prices)	 is	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 Estimates	 are	 obtained	
controlling	for	a	set	of	dummies	that	are	equal	one	if	the	individual	i	has	reached	experience	x	at	year	
t.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
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Tab.	4:	Association	between	wages,	parental	education	and	experience		
(not	controlling	for	child	education)1	
M0	 M1	 M1	(restricted	sample)2	
	
Random		
effects	
Random		
effects	
Fixed		
effects	
Random		
effects	 Fixed	effects	
Par.	educ.	 0.024005***	 0.012112***	 .	 0.012590***	 .	
[0.001519]	 [0.001454]	 .	 [0.002233]	 .	
Exp.*Par.	educ.	 0.000031***	 0.000031***	 0.000029***	 0.000029***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	
N	 88,000	 88,000	 88,000	 43,178	 43,178	
1	Log	of	weekly	gross	wage	(at	constant	prices)	is	the	dependent	variable.	Control	variables	are	age,	
age	 squared,	 dummy	 for	part‐time,	 third	 order	 polynomial	 on	 effective	 experience	 (in	weeks)	 and	
fixed	effects	for	region	of	work,	year	and	cohort	of	entry	into	employment.	2	The	sample	is	restricted	
to	those	entered	in	employment	in	the	period	1980‐1989.	Standard	errors	clustered	by	individuals	in	
parenthesis.	*	p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
	
	
Tab.	5:	Quantification	of	the	impact	of	child	and	parental	education	along	the	career	
M1	model	 M2	model	
Parental	educ.		 Child	educ.	 Parental	educ.	
Exp.	0	 Exp.	1	 Exp.	20	 Exp.	0	 Exp.	1	 Exp.	20	 Exp.	0	 Exp.	1	 Exp.	20	
1	year	of	educ.	
Starting	salary	 1.21%	 .	 .	 1.44% .	 .	 0.67%	 .	 .	
Growth	effect	 .	 0.16%	 3.22%	 .	 0.18% 3.54%	 0.08%	 1.66%	
Total	effect	 1.21%	 1.37%	 4.43%	 1.44% 1.62% 4.98%	 0.67%	 0.75%	 2.33%	
5	years	of	educ.	
Starting	salary	 6.06%	 .	 .	 7.20% .	 .	 3.33%	 .	 .	
Growth	effect	 .	 0.81%	 16.12% .	 0.88% 17.68% .	 0.42%	 8.32%	
Total	effect	 6.06%	 6.87%	 22.18% 7.20% 8.08% 24.88% 3.33%	 3.75%	 11.65%
Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
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Tab.	6:	Association	between	wages,	child	and	parental	education	and	experience1	
	 M2	
M2
(restricted	sample)2	
"Father	and	mother"
model3	
	
Random	
effects	
Fixed
effects	
Random
effects	
Fixed
Effects	
Random	
Effects	
Fixed
effects	
Child	educ.	 0.014390***	 .	 0.009960***	 .	 0.013843***	 .	
[0.001433]	 .	 [0.002029]	 .	 [0.001504]	 .	
Par.	educ.	 0.006658***	 .	 0.008639***	 .	 	 	
[0.001483]	 .	 [0.002277]	 .	 	 	
Exp*Child	ed.	 0.000034***	 0.000034*** 0.000037***	 0.000037*** 0.000034***	 0.000034***	
[0.000002]	 [0.000002]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000002]	 [0.000003]	
Exp*Par.	ed..	 0.000016***	 0.000016*** 0.000014***	 0.000014*** 	 	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	 	 	
Father	ed..	 	 0.003625**	 .	
	 [0.001470]	 .	
Mother	ed..	 	 0.003526**	 .	
	 [0.001672]	 .	
Exp*Fath.	ed..	 	 0.000007**	 0.000007**	
	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	
Exp*Moth.	ed.	 	 0.000010***	 0.000010***	
	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	
Fath.ed..=	
Moth.ed.	 	 	 	 	 0.9712	 	
Exp*Fath.ed.=	
Exp*Moth.ed.	 	 	 	 	 0.4545	 0.4756	
N	 88,000	 88,000	 43,178	 43,178	 81,873	 81,873	
1	Log	of	weekly	gross	wage	(at	constant	prices)	is	the	dependent	variable.	Control	variables	are	age,	
age	 squared,	 dummy	 on	 part‐time,	 third	 order	 polynomial	 on	 effective	 experience	 (in	weeks)	 and	
fixed	effects	for	region	of	work,	year	and	cohort	of	entry	into	employment.	2	The	sample	is	restricted	
to	those	entered	in	employment	in	the	period	1980‐1989.	3Dependent	and	control	variables	as	in	M2	
model;	 parental	 education	 is	 split	 in	 father	 and	 mother	 education.	 P‐values	 of	 Wald	 tests	 are	
presented	 to	 test	 the	equality	of	 the	estimated	coefficients	 related	 to	 father	and	mother	education.	
Standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 individuals	 in	 parenthesis.	 *	 p<0.10;	 **	 p<0.05;	 ***	 p<0.01.	 Source:	
elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
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Tab.	7:	Association	between	wages,	experience	and	educational	mobility		
1	Log	 of	weekly	 gross	wage	 is	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 Control	 variables	 as	 in	M1	 and	M2	models.	
Parental	education	is	L	when	average	years	of	education	is	at	most	5,	M	when	they	are	between5	and	
8,	H	when	they	are	higher	than	8.	Child	education	is	L	when	years	of	education	are	at	most	8,	M	when	
they	are	between8	and	18,	H	when	they	are	at	least	18.	Standard	errors	clustered	by	individuals	in	
parenthesis.	*p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Random	effects	 Fixed	effects	
Par.	H‐Ch.	H	 0.148404***	 .	
[0.024430]	 .	
Par.	M‐Ch.	H	 0.068624**	 .	
[0.032730]	 .	
Par.	L‐Ch.	H	 0.001025	 .	
[0.033604]	 .	
Par.	H‐Ch.	M	 0.02252	 .	
[0.014883]	 .	
Par.	L‐Ch.	M	 ‐0.024715**	 .	
[0.012066]	 .	
Par.	H‐Ch.	L	 ‐0.063553**	 .	
[0.027819]	 .	
Par.	M‐Ch.	L	 ‐0.084207***	 .	
[0.016175]	 .	
Par.	L‐Ch.	L	 ‐0.098511***	 .	
[0.012128]	 .	
Par.	H‐Ch.	H*Exp	 0.000444***	 0.000448***	
[0.000047]	 [0.000047]	
Par.	M‐Ch.	H*Exp	 0.000323***	 0.000322***	
[0.000065]	 [0.000066]	
Par.	L‐Ch.	H*Exp	 0.000322***	 0.000304***	
[0.000056]	 [0.000055]	
Par.	H‐Ch.	M*Exp	 0.000069**	 0.000065**	
[0.000032]	 [0.000033]	
Par.	L‐Ch.	M*Exp	 ‐0.000028	 ‐0.000026	
[0.000023]	 [0.000023]	
Par.	H‐Ch.	L*Exp	 ‐0.000127**	 ‐0.000123**	
[0.000053]	 [0.000055]	
Par.	M‐Ch.	L*Exp	 ‐0.000094***	 ‐0.000094***	
[0.000031]	 [0.000031]	
Par.	L‐Ch.	L*Exp	 ‐0.000163***	 ‐0.000164***	
[0.000021]	 [0.000022]	
N	 88,000	 88,000	
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Tab.	8:	P‐values	of	Wald	tests	of	the	estimated	coefficients	of	the	association	between	wages,	
experience	and	educational	mobility	in	Table	7	
*	p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
	
	 	
	 Random	effects	 Fixed	effects	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	H	=		Par.	M‐Ch.	H	 0.035	(**)	 	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	H	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	H	 0.000	(***)	 	
Par.	M	‐Ch.	H	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	H	 0.099	(*)	 	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	M	=		Par.	M‐Ch.	M	 0.130	 	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	M	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	M	 0.000	(***)	 	
Par.	M	‐Ch.	M	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	M	 0.041	(**)	 	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	L	=		Par.	M‐Ch.	L	 0.474	 	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	L	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	L	 0.192	 	
Par.	M	‐Ch.	L	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	L	 0.306	 	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	H	*Exp	=		Par.	M‐Ch.	H	*Exp	 0.101	(*)	 0.0954	(*)	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	H	*Exp	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	H	*Exp	 0.069	(*)	 0.0298	(**)	
Par.	M	‐Ch.	H	*Exp	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	H	*Exp	 0.990	 0.8245	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	M	*Exp	=		Par.	M‐Ch.	M	*Exp	 0.033	(**)	 0.046	(**)	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	M	*Exp	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	M	*Exp	 0.001	(***)	 0.0023	(***)	
Par.	M	‐Ch.	M	*Exp	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	M	*Exp	 0.222	 0.260	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	L	*Exp	=		Par.	M‐Ch.	L	*Exp	 0.551	 0.6095	
Par.	H	‐Ch.	L	*Exp	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	L	*Exp	 0.481	 0.4230	
Par.	M	‐Ch.	L	*Exp	=		Par.	L‐Ch.	L	*Exp	 0.009	(***)	 0.0084	(***)	
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Fig.	3:	Association	between	wages,	parental	education	and	experience	along	the	wage	distribution.	
Quantile	fixed	effects	estimates.	
	
1	Log	of	weekly	gross	wage	is	the	dependent	variable.	Control	variables	as	in	M1	and	M2	models	of	
Tables	4‐5.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
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Tab.	9:	Mean	number	of	firm	changes	and	ratio	between	unemployment	and	working	weeks	since	the	
entry	in	the	labour	market,	by	child	and	highest	parental	education	
	 Number	of	firm	changes	 Share	of	unemployment	weeks	
	 Child	education	 Parental	education Child	education	 Parental	education	
Primary	 3.6	 3.1	 13.8%	 11.7%	
Lower	secondary	 3.2	 2.8	 13.3%	 12.5%	
Upper	secondary	 2.6	 2.6	 10.5%	 10.8%	
Tertiary	 2.5	 2.2	 7.7%	 7.8%	
Total	 2.9	 2.9	 11.7%	 11.7%	
Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
	
	
Tab.	10:	Association	between	wages,	child	education,	parental	education	and	experience1,	controlling	
for	firm	changes	and	unemployment	spells2	
Random	effects	 Fixed	effects	
	 Firm	changes	
Firm	changes	and
unemp.	spells	 Firm	changes	
Firm	changes	and	
unemp.	spells	
Child	educ.	 0.013905***	 0.016403***	 .	 .	
[0.001496]	 [0.001677]	 .	 .	
Par.	educ.	 0.006395***	 0.005866***	 .	 .	
[0.001569]	 [0.001763]	 .	 .	
Exp*Child	educ.	 0.000031***	 0.000030***	 0.000030***	 0.000029***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	
Exp*Par.	educ.	 0.000012***	 0.000012***	 0.000011***	 0.000011***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	
Child	educ.*changes	 0.001784**	 0.001547**	 0.002326***	 0.002078***	
[0.000707]	 [0.000704]	 [0.000752]	 [0.000752]	
Par.	educ.*changes	 0.001465*	 0.001542*	 0.001995**	 0.002131**	
[0.000870]	 [0.000870]	 [0.000931]	 [0.000939]	
Child	educ.*unemp.	 ‐0.005986***	 ‐0.004654***	
[0.001664]	 [0.001722]	
Par.	educ.*unemp.	 0.001098	 0.001907	
[0.001847]	 [0.001938]	
N	 88,000	 88,000	 88,000	 88,000	
1	Log	of	weekly	gross	wage	 is	 the	dependent	variable.	Control	variables	as	 in	M2	model	of	Table	5,	
plus	 the	 number	 of	 firm	 changes,	 and	 dummies	 for	 periods	 spent	 in	 a	 year	 as	 unemployed	 or	
receiving	CIG.	2	Firm	changes	is	expressed	by	the	(time	varying)	number	of	previous	changes	along	
the	career.	An	unemployment	 spell	 is	 identified	 in	 case	of	at	 least	13	weeks	not	worked	 in	a	year.	
Standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 individuals	 in	 parenthesis.	 *	 p<0.10;	 **	 p<0.05;	 ***	 p<0.01.	 Source:	
elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
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APPENDIX	
	
Tab.	A1:	Association	between	wages,	child	education,	parental	education	and	experience.	Fixed	
effects	estimates:	further	specifications	of	the	M1	model1	
S1	 S2	 S3	 S4	 S5	
	
Job		
features	
S1	plus		
firms	features	
S2	for		
post	1987		
entrants	
M2	on		
log	annual		
earnings	
S2	on		
log	annual		
earnings	
Exp.*Par.	educ.	 0.000029***	 0.000029***	 0.000034***	 0.000028***	 0.000030***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000003]	
N	 86,825	 72,891	 31,925	 87,479	 72,522	
1	Log	of	weekly	 gross	wage	 is	 the	dependent	 variable	 in	 S1‐S3;	 log	of	 annual	 gross	 earnings	 is	 the	
dependent	variable	in	S4‐S5.	Control	variables	as	in	M1	model	of	Table	4.2	Additional	controls	in	S1	
are	a	 third	order	polynomial	on	 tenure	and	dummies	on	occupation,	on	periods	spent	 in	a	year	as	
unemployed	or	receiving	CIG.	Additional	controls	in	S2	are	the	same	as	in	S1	plus	firm's	sector	and	
size.	 S3	 is	 restricted	 to	 cohorts	 entered	 in	 employment	 since	 1987.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	
individuals	in	parenthesis.	*	p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
	
	
Tab.	A2:	Association	between	wages,	child	education,	parental	education	and	experience.	Fixed	
effects	estimates:	further	specifications	of	the	M2	model1	
S1	 S2	 S3	 S4	 S5	
	
Job		
features	
S1	plus		
firms	features	
S2	for		
post	1987		
entrants	
M2	on		
log	annual		
earnings	
S2	on		
log	annual		
earnings	
Exp*ch.	ed.	 0.000031***	 0.000030***	 0.000032***	 0.000037***	 0.000036***	
[0.000002]	 [0.000002]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	
Exp*par.	ed.	 0.000016***	 0.000016***	 0.000022***	 0.000011***	 0.000015***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000003]	
N	 86,825	 72,891	 31,925	 87,479	 72,522	
1	Log	of	weekly	 gross	wage	 is	 the	dependent	 variable	 in	 S1‐S3;	 log	of	 annual	 gross	 earnings	 is	 the	
dependent	variable	in	S4‐S5.	Control	variables	as	in	M1	model	of	Table	4.2	Additional	controls	in	S1	
are	a	 third	order	polynomial	on	 tenure	and	dummies	on	occupation,	on	periods	spent	 in	a	year	as	
unemployed	or	receiving	CIG.	Additional	controls	in	S2	are	the	same	as	in	S1	plus	firm's	sector	and	
size.	 S3	 is	 restricted	 to	 cohorts	 entered	 in	 employment	 since	 1987.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	
individuals	in	parenthesis.	*	p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data.	
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Tab.	A3:	M2	model	plus	interactions	with	a	third	order	polynomial	on	experience.	
“Third	order”	model1	
Random	effects	 Fixed	effects	
Child	educ.	 0.01519423***	 .	
[0.00177025]	 .	
Exp*Child	educ.	 0.00002820***	 0.00002461**	
[0.00001005]	 [0.00001015]	
Exp2/1000*Child	educ.	 0.00000617	 0.00001242	
[0.00001586]	 [0.00001566]	
Exp3/100000*Child	educ.	 ‐0.00000015	 ‐0.00000042	
[0.00000071]	 [0.00000069]	
Parental	educ.	 0.00413558**	 .	
[0.00183421]	 .	
Exp*	Par.	educ.	 0.00003362***	 0.00003420***	
[0.00001121]	 [0.00001143]	
Exp2/1000*Par.	Educ.	 ‐0.00002116	 ‐0.00002153	
[0.00001820]	 [0.00001829]	
Exp3/100000*Par.	Educ.	 0.00000058	 0.00000059	
[0.00000083]	 [0.00000082]	
(Par.	educ*exp	+Par.educ.*exp2+	Par.educ*exp3)=0	 11.27	(***)	 11.32	(***)	
N	 88,000	 88,000	
1	Dependent	 and	 control	 variables	 as	 in	 M2	 model	 plus	 a	 third	 order	 polynomial	 on	 experience	
interacted	 with	 both	 child	 and	 parental	 education.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 individuals	 in	
parenthesis.	F	tests	of	joint	nullity	of	interacted	polynomial	of	experience	and	parental	education	are	
reported.	*	p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.		
Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
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Tab.	A4:	Association	between	wages,	child	education,	parental	education	and	experience1,	controlling	
for	firm	changes	and	unemployment	spells	and	distinguishing	experience	as	private	employees	or	
other	types	of	works2	
Random	effects	 Fixed	effects	
	 Firm	changes	
Firm	changes	and
unemp.	spells	 Firm	changes	
Firm	changes	and
unemp.	spells	
Child	educ.	 0.013491***	 0.015966***	 .	 .	
[0.001488]	 [0.001668]	 .	 .	
Par.	educ.	 0.006230***	 0.005611***	 .	 .	
[0.001561]	 [0.001751]	 .	 .	
Pr.	Emp.	Exp*child	educ. 0.000031***	 0.000030***	 0.000030***	 0.000029***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	 [0.000003]	
Pr.	Emp.	Exp	*par.	educ.	 0.000016***	 0.000016***	 0.000014***	 0.000014***	
[0.000003]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000004]	
Oth.	Exp*child	educ.	 0.000032***	 0.000031***	 0.000031***	 0.000030***	
[0.000004]	 [0.000004]	 [0.000005]	 [0.000005]	
Oth.	Exp	*par.	educ.	 0.000003	 0.000004	 0.000002	 0.000003	
[0.000006]	 [0.000006]	 [0.000006]	 [0.000006]	
Child	educ.*changes	 0.001800**	 0.001567**	 0.002336***	 0.002091***	
[0.000705]	 [0.000702]	 [0.000749]	 [0.000750]	
Par.	educ.*changes	 0.001535*	 0.001623*	 0.002076**	 0.002220**	
[0.000871]	 [0.000872]	 [0.000931]	 [0.000939]	
Child	educ.*unemp.	 ‐0.005920***	 ‐0.004609***	
[0.001667]	 [0.001726]	
Par.	educ.*unemp.	 0.001325	 0.002042	
[0.001830]	 [0.001919]	
N	 88,000	 88,000	 88,000	 88,000	
1	Log	of	weekly	gross	wage	 is	 the	dependent	variable.	Control	variables	as	 in	M2	model	of	Table	5,	
plus	 the	 number	 of	 firm	 changes,	 and	 dummies	 for	 periods	 spent	 in	 a	 year	 as	 unemployed	 or	
receiving	CIG.	2	The	total	experience	is	split	in	periods	spent	as	a	private	employee	or	a	self‐employed	
and	both	types	of	experiences	are	included	among	the	covariates	(instead	that	the	total	experience)	
as	 a	 third	 order	 polynomial	 and	 interacted	 with	 child	 and	 parental	 education.	 Firm	 changes	 is	
expressed	 by	 the	 (time	 varying)	 number	 of	 previous	 changes	 along	 the	 career.	 An	 unemployment	
spell	 is	 identified	 in	 case	 of	 at	 least	 13	weeks	 not	worked	 in	 a	 year.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	
individuals	in	parenthesis.	*	p<0.10;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01.	Source:	elaborations	on	AD‐SILC	data	
	
	
	
	
